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FIRST

AMENDMENT

Isthe Solomon
Amendment Unconstitutional?
by Dale Carpenter.

PREVIEW o United States Supreme Court Cases, pages 143-147 © 2005 American Bar Association.

Dale Carpenter is an associate
professor at the University of
Minnesota Law School. He teaches
and writes in the areas of
Constitutional Law, the First
Amendment, and Sexual
Orientation and the Law. Ile can
be reached atdalecarp@umn.edu.
or (612) 625-5537.

The case involves a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Solomon
Amendment, federal legislation
sponsored by U.S. Representative
Gerald Solomon (R-NY) and originally passed in 1994. The law originally mandated that "no federal
funds available to the Department of
Defense may be provided by grant
or contract to any institution of
higher education that has a policy of
denying, or which effectively prevents, the Secretary of Defense from
obtaining for military recruiting purposes ... entry to campuses or

ISSUE
Was the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals correct in concluding that
the Solomon Amendment likely violates the First Amendment by conditioning the receipt of federal funds
on schools' relinquishment of their
constitutionally protected right to
exclude military recruiters?

FACTS
Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and the other petitioners
(collectively, the government) are
the heads of federal government
departments that would cut off
funding to schools that fail to give
equal access to military recruiters.
The Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc., and the
other respondents (collectively,
FAIR) are groups and individuals
who support freedom of association
for universities and oppose the military's policy of excluding openly gay
service members. FAIR, the lead
respondent, is an association of universities and faculties, especially
faculties of law schools.

access to students on campuses."
In subsequent years the Solomon
Amendment's funding condition was
expanded to include funds available
to universities from the Departments of Homeland Security, Health
and Human Services, Labor,
Education, and Transportation, as
well as the National Security
Administration and the Central
Intelligence Agency. Congress also
clarified that the condition applied
(Continued on Page 144)
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to an entire university even if only a
"subelement" within the university
(e.g., a university's law school)
denied access to military recruiters.
Finally, in 2004, Congress further
required that, under the funding
condition, military recruiters must
be given access to the institution
"that is at least equal in quality and
scope to the access to campuses and
to students that is provided to any
other employer."
The Solomon Amendment runs afoul
of many universities' non-discrimination policies, which forbid discrimination on the basis of, among other
things, sexual orientation. Law
schools especially, both on their own
initiative and in compliance with the
guidelines of the American
Association of Law Schools, allow a
prospective employer to recruit students in their facilities only if the
employer signs a statement pledging
not to discriminate on the basis of
several criteria, including sexual orientation. The military, however, bans
service by openly gay personnel
under the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
policy adopted by Congress in 1994.
Thus, many law schools have prohibited, or would like to prohibit, military recruiters from their campuses.
At the same time, universities do
not want to lose federal funding,
which totals more than S35 billion
annually and goes to many causes,
such as important scientific and
medical research. Thus, even law
schools that do not themselves
receive federal funds from any of
the agencies and departments covered by the Solomon Amendment
have reluctantly agreed to allow military recruiters in their facilities.
This litigation is an effort to have
the Solomon Amendment declared
unconstitutional and thus to permit
law schools and other parts of a university to bar military recruiting
without losing all federal funds as a
consequence.

In September 2003, FAIR (and the
other respondents) brought suit
against Rumsfeld (and the other
petitioners) in a New Jersey federal
district court, arguing that the
Solomon Amendment violated their
First Amendment rights. The district court denied FAIR's request for
a preliminary injunction against
enforcement of the Solomon
Amendment.
FAIR then appealed to the Third
Circuit. A divided panel of the Third
Circuit held that FAIR was likely to
prevail on its First Amendment
claims and directed the district
court to enjoin enforcement of the
Solomon Amendment. However, on
January 20, 2005, the Third Circuit
granted the government's request to
stay its decision pending appeal to
the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court granted the
government's petition for writ of
certiorari on May 2, 2005.
CASE ANALYSIS
The government's basic argument is
that it may condition the receipt of
federal funds on the ability of the
military to recruit on campus the
very students whose education the
government funding supports. This
state interest is especially great, it
argues, in the military context in
which there is a strong national
need to recruit the best talent. This
is precisely what the Solomon
Amendment does. It does not mandate that educational institutions
admit recruiters; instead, it places a
condition on funding. In short, the
government argues, if the schools do
not want to admit military recruiters
they are still free to bar them, they
just must forgo federal money.
FAIR's basic argument is that an
educational institution's decision to
bar military recruiters is constitutionally protected, both as an
expression of moral and professional
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disapproval of anti-gay discrimination and as an exercise of associational freedom. These constitutional
interests are especially important in
a setting, such as a university,
where academic freedom is paramount. Thus, here as in other contexts, the government may not condition the receipt of a broad array of
government benefits on the surrender of constitutional rights.
The government first urges that no
freedom of association is injured by
the Solomon Amendment. The central case in the argument between
the parties is the Court's 2000 decision in Boy Scouts of America v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000), in which
the Court held that the Boy Scouts
had an associational right to
exclude an openly gay scoutmaster
despite a state law barring discrimination against gays.
The government distinguishes
Dale by noting that the Solomon
Amendment does not affect the
composition of the schools' membership; the recruiters' presence is only
temporary and episodic. Further, the
government argues that unlike Dale,
this case does not involve an
attempt by the state to convey any
message about service by gays in the
military since everyone understands
that recruiters speak only for their
employers and not for the schools in
which they recruit. Finally, unlike
Dale, this case involves a condition
on funding, not a direct regulatory
mandate.
FAIR responds that the freedom of
association recognized in Dale is
indeed at stake in this case. The
Solomon Amendment, FAIR claims,
violates the schools' freedom of
association by infringing their "right
to choose for themselves which
causes to assist or resist." The freedom of association is not limited to
the ability to control membership in
an organization, FAIR argues, but
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extends to the full range of associational activities by which a group
aids or refuses to aid a cause.
The government next argues that
the Solomon Amendment does not
violate the "compelled speech" doctrine, under which citizens may
refuse to be made the mouthpiece
for some message the government
would like to send. The Solomon
Amendment, argues the government, simply does not force schools
to send the message that they agree
with the military's exclusion of gays.
FAIR counters that the Solomon
Amendment does compel speech. It
requires the schools to serve military recruiters affirmatively through
quintessential "speech" activities,
like distributing, posting, and printing literature announcing the presence of the recruiters; introducing
students to the government; and
sponsoring private forums for the
exchange of information (the
recruiting interview sessions themselves). This, argues FAIR, requires
a school "to disseminate, carry, or
host a message against its will."
The government further argues that
the schools' refusal to admit military recruiters is not a form of
''expressive conduct" protected
under the intermediate scrutiny
standard of United States v.

O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
Refusing to give recruiters equal
access to facilities, argues the government, is not inherently expressive. Refusing such access is merely
conduct and as such does not enjoy
any First Amendment speech protection. Even if the O'Brien intermediate scrutiny standard applied,
moreover, the government argues
that the Solomon Amendment satisfies that standard since it is sufficiently tailored to achieving the government's important goal of hiring
the best talent for military service
and does not aim at speech for the
purpose of suppressing ideas.

FAIR argues that, on the contrary,
the schools' refusal to allow employers who discriminate to recruit is
part of its overall message that such
discrimination is immoral. Barring
recruiters who discriminate is a way
to "punctuate" a school's message
by refusing to assist discrimination.
Moreover, argues FAIR, the Solomon
Amendment is not narrowly tailored
to serve the government's admittedly compelling interest in military
recruitment. There is no evidence,
argues FAIR, that military recruiters
require access to schools in order to
meet recruiting goals, much less
that the military must have "equal
access" to achieve its recruiting
goals.
Finally, the government argues that
the Solomon Amendment does not
violate the "unconstitutional conditions" doctrine, under which the
government generally may not condition the receipt of a government
benefit on the relinquishment of a
constitutional right. First, the government contends that the Solomon
Amendment would be constitutional
even if it were imposed as a direct
mandate requiring the schools to
admit military recruiters on an
equal basis with all other employers.
Since there is no constitutional
right enjoyed by the schools to
exclude military recruiters, the
government reasons, they have not
been required to relinquish the
exercise of any right in order to get
a government benefit. Congress has
not aimed at the suppression of
ideas by adopting the Solomon
Amendment, the government
argues; it has simply used its constitutional power to spend in the interests of the nation.
FAIR responds that the Solomon
Amendment places a penalty on the
exercise of First Amendment rights
and thus violates the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. This is
not a case, notes FAIR, in which the

government has simply required
that certain funds be used only for
the purpose for which they are provided (e.g., the government may
require that education funds be
spent on education). Instead, the
Solomon Amendment attempts a
sweeping denial of almost all federal
assistance to an entire educational
institution merely because one part
of it-a part that might itself receive
no federal money-refuses to allow
the military to recruit.
SIGNIFICANCE
This case rests at the intersection of
three great controversies in modern
American law and life. First, there
are the needs of the military to
recruit the best and brightest in a
time of war and uncertainty about
national security. The schools' decisions to exclude military recruiters
would never be a very popular
one-less so in present circumstances. To many, universities'
exclusion of the militarv looks like
the action 6f an elite caste mocking
the soldiers who guard them while
they sleep.
Second, the case is set in the context of the ongoing cultural struggle
over whether discrimination against
gays is ever acceptable and, if so,
under what circumstances. To the
schools, the exclusion of the military recruiters is a way to defend
their moral perspective that discrimination against gays in the military is wrong and contrary to their
professional standards. The use of
Dale, which held that gays could be
excluded from an association, to
justify excluding those who exclude
gays, is an especially ironic note in
the litigation.
Third, the case raises the questions
of the extent of government power
over the lives of its citizens and of
the continuing vitality of federalism-the relationship between the
(Continued on Page 146)
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states and the federal government.
Government power to suppress constitutional rights has historically
taken the form of old-fashioned
compulsion: for example, a threat of
jail for failure to abide by the government's command. However, in an
age of vast federal spending, government power to compel conduct is
more likely to take the form of conditions placed on that spending.
When that form of compulsion
affects state institutions, like a state
university, the central question
ceases to be simply about the relationship between the federal government and the individual citizen and
begins to be about the relationship
between the federal government and
the states.
To accept FAIR's claim, the Court
will likely have to conclude both
that (1) a school's decision to bar
military recruiters is the exercise of
a constitutional right (freedom of
speech and/or freedom of association) and that (2) the government's
denial of funding to the entire university for the exercise of this liberty is an unconstitutional penalty or
condition.
To accept the government's claim,
the Court need only agree with the
government on one of these points.
The Court could conclude, for
example, that barring military
recruiters from campus is not constitutionally protected (so that even
a mandate to allow them would be
acceptable). In that case, the Court
would not even have to rule on the
conditional funding question.
Alternatively, the Court could conclude that the exclusion of military
recruiters is indeed constitutionally
protected, but that the government
may refuse to give any funding to
schools that bar recruiters.
Whichever way the Court rules, it
will have the opportunity to clarify
some rather murky constitutional
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doctrines. First, there is the question
of the reach of the freedom of association. Is it, as the government contends, a doctrine that protects only
i the membership decisions a group
makes? Or is it a much broader right
that protects many associational
activities by which a group promotes
its message? If it is the former, the
freedom of association is not a very
robust doctrine, since it leaves the
state free to hobble a group's message in numerous indirect ways. If it
is the latter, the freedom of association risks giving expressive groups a
broad right to refuse to comply with
general regulations backed by important state interests.
Second, there is the question of how
broadly the Court defines the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. If the government may deny
an entire university all funding (e.g.,
cancer research funding) because
one part of the university exercises
a constitutional right, could it similarly leverage its economic power to
require the university to allow a
military officer on campus to deliver
the government's message about the
need for high defense spending?
Could it threaten to withdraw all
university funding unless the university agreed to forgo its right to
"ameliorate" the recruiters' presence on campus (e.g., by posting
written notices outside the interview room indicating the school's
disagreement with the military's
exclusion of gays)?
If, on the other, the government
can't condition funding in this way,
could it continue to condition funding on a school's agreement not to
discriminate against students or
employees on the basis of race or
sex (as it now does through civil
rights laws)? Or is there some way
to distinguish the conditional funding embedded in civil rights law
from the Solomon Amendment, as
FAIR and its amici suggest?

Of course, there is always the possibility that the Court will rule without clarifying the answers to any of
these questions.
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